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SOME REFLECTIONS OF A MÉTIS LAW STUDENT AND ASSISTANT
PROFESSOR ON INDIGENOUS LEGAL EDUCATION IN CANADA
Scott Franks ‡
ABSTRACT

This Article is a reflection on some of my experiences as a Métis law
student and assistant professor on the subject of Indigenous legal education
in Canada. I introduce myself and what brought me to law school and
describe some of my experiences as a law student, as a co-president of an
Indigenous Students Association, and as a student organizer for an
Indigenous law camp. I argue that a significant barrier to Indigenization and
decolonization of Canadian legal education is the perseverance of an
ideology rooted in settler colonialism and an individual affective
commitment to its future, which is facilitated by racism. The existence and
nature of this barrier is highlighted through an exploratory discussion of
some of the experiences that are commonly shared by Indigenous law
students and professors. I describe my approach to Indigenous legal
education at the Lincoln Alexander School of Law (“Lincoln Alexander”)
at X University in Toronto, Ontario, as one way to work towards facilitating
efforts towards Indigenization and decolonization.
Although the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s Final Report
and Calls to Action (“Calls”) have significantly impacted Indigenization
activities in Canadian legal education, choices to be made about how the
Calls are to be implemented are not self-evident. Thus, as an assistant
professor at Lincoln Alexander School of Law, I am now trying to decide
how to do this work. I propose a pedagogy based on the deconstruction or
critique of settler colonial and racial hierarchies embedded in the rule of
law through critical methodologies. This deconstruction is necessary before
we can effectively teach students about Indigenous legal orders. When we
do teach Indigenous legal orders, we should consider teaching those orders
in stand-alone courses or focusing on Indigenous legal methodologies in our
courses. Finally, I briefly discuss a proposal for integrating Indigenous legal
issues and perspectives in the curriculum.

Scott Franks is an assistant professor at the Lincoln Alexander School of Law at X University
(Ryerson University), with a J.D. from Osgoode Hall Law School, and an LL.M. from
Osgoode Hall Law School. He is a former associate of Olthuis Kleer Townshend LLP and
former clerk at the Supreme Court of Canada. The author acknowledges the support of
faculty colleagues at the Lincoln Alexander School of Law and the research assistance of
Desneige Frandsen and Oksana Romanov. Professors Angela Lee and Hilary EvansCameron provided helpful comments on drafts of this contribution.
‡
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I.

INTRODUCTION

I am a citizen of the Manitoba Métis Federation. 1 My mother’s and
father’s families are originally from the area surrounding the Red River in
Manitoba. Sometime after the Red River Resistance in 1870, my family went
west into Saskatchewan, where they settled along the north Saskatchewan
River in the territory of the Nehiyaw Nation. 2 Although I am ethnically and
culturally Métis, most of my childhood was in the context of Nehiyawak and
settler culture in La Ronge, Saskatchewan—a northern, rural community
governed under the adhesion to Treaty 6. 3
I am writing this Article to share the experiences that I have had in my
capacity over the years as a Métis law student, law clerk, lawyer, and now, as
an assistant professor. I will describe my experiences alongside the
scholarship and writing of Indigenous law students, professors, and lawyers.
I will then discuss some of the Indigenization initiatives that I am
undertaking at the Lincoln Alexander School of Law. I hope that my
experiences resonate and affirm those of other Indigenous law students and
professors, or alternatively, provide space for mutual reflection on the
differences in our journeys. For American readers, I hope my footnotes
provide an orientation to the Canadian literature on Indigenous legal
education, broadly understood.
The momentum to Indigenize Canadian law schools has grown over
the last six years. 4 This momentum is attributable, in part, to the findings
American readers may be unfamiliar with the Métis people as an Aboriginal people. For
more information on the history of Métis governance, see KELLY SAUNDERS & JANIQUE
DUBOIS, MÉTIS POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE IN CANADA (2019).
The Red River Resistance has been the subject of several non-Métis Canadian historians’
work. See, e.g., GERHARD J. ENS, HOMELAND TO HINTERLAND: THE CHANGING WORLDS
OF THE RED RIVER METIS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1996) (Can.); DALE GIBSON,
LAW, LIFE AND GOVERNMENT AT RED RIVER, VOL. 1: SETTLEMENT AND GOVERNANCE,
1812-1872 (2015) (Can.).
American readers may be unfamiliar with Treaty 6. For more information, see generally
ALEXANDER MORRIS, THE TREATIES OF CANADA WITH THE INDIANS OF MANITOBA AND
THE NORTH-WEST TERRITORIES (2014); HAROLD CARDINAL & WALTER HILDEBRANDT,
TREATY ELDERS OF SASKATCHEWAN: OUR DREAM IS THAT OUR PEOPLES WILL ONE DAY
BE CLEARLY RECOGNIZED AS NATIONS (2000).
For the purposes of this Article, Aboriginal law refers to Canadian law as it relates to
Indigenous peoples, whereas Indigenous law refers to the legal orders of Indigenous peoples.
1

2

3

4

745

746

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:3

and Calls to Action of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (“TRC”)
that were released in 2015. 5 As an assistant professor at the Lincoln
Alexander School of Law at X University, 6 I welcome this renewed
commitment to Indigenize the curricula at Canadian law schools. The need
to explain why Indigenous legal education is necessary is becoming less and
less pressing. 7 As a result, many scholars now focus on how Indigenous law
can be brought into Canadian legal education and practice. 8 However, I am
Indigenous legal education refers to any activity that integrates Indigenous pedagogies,
epistemologies, ontologies, or cosmologies, or that integrates Indigenous legal perspectives,
issues, or laws in the curriculum. For a survey of recent commentary in Canada on
Indigenizing the academy, see Karen Drake, Finding a Path to Reconciliation: Mandatory
Indigenous Law, Anishinaabe Pedagogy, and Academic Freedom, 95 CAN. B. REV. 9, 10–
12 (2017).

See Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future: Summary of the Final Report of the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMM’N
5

OF CAN. (2015), http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/201/301/weekly_acquisition_lists/2015/w15-24-

F-E.html/collections/collection_2015/trc/IR4-7-2015-eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NQN6RZ3F]; TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF CANADA: CALLS TO ACTION,
TRUTH
AND
RECONCILIATION
COMM’N
OF
CAN.
(2015),
https://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/british-columbians-our-governments/indigenouspeople/aboriginal-peoples-documents/calls_to_action_english2.pdf [https://perma.cc/FX48NSCP] [hereinafter CALLS TO ACTION].
While the university is in the process of being renamed, the Indigenous faculty members at
“Ryerson” University refer to their employer as X University. For more information on this
decision and the role of Egerton Ryerson, the school’s namesake, in the design of the Indian
Residential School model in Canada, see Indigenous Students from X University,
Introducing X University: An Open Letter to the Community from Indigenous Students,
YELLOWHEAD
INST.
(May
11,
2021)
(Can.),
https://yellowheadinstitute.org/2021/05/11/welcome-to-x-university-an-open-letter-to-thecommunity-from-indigenous-students/ [https://perma.cc/STV2-SUKM]; see also Egerton
Ryerson Statue Toppled at Canada Indigenous School Protest, BBC NEWS (June 7, 2021)
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-57381522 [https://perma.cc/BX6P-LRWQ].
For an argument on why education in Indigenous legal orders is necessary, see Drake, supra
note 4, at 13–22; LANCE FINCH, THE DUTY TO LEARN: TAKING ACCOUNT OF INDIGENOUS
LEGAL ORDERS IN PRACTICE (2012).
See, e.g., Fraser Harland, Moving from the Why to the How of Indigenous Law, 1 MCGILL
L.J. 721 (2016) (Can.); Val Napoleon & Hadley Friedland, An Inside Job: Engaging with
Indigenous Legal Traditions Through Stories, 61 MCGILL L.J. 725, 733 (2015) (Can.)
[hereinafter An Inside Job]; Aaron James (Waabishki Ma’iingan) Mills, The Lifeworlds of
Law: On Revitalizing Indigenous Legal Orders Today, 61 MCGILL L.J. 847, 856–57 (2016)
(Can.) [hereinafter The Lifeworlds of Law]. Scholars have developed innovative, pragmatic,
and persuasive pedagogies based on both Indigenous and western epistemological and
ontological frameworks. See Hadley Friedland, Reflective Frameworks: Methods for
Accessing, Understanding and Applying Indigenous Laws, 11 INDIGENOUS L.J. 1 (2012)
(Can.); Hadley Friedland & Val Napoleon, Gathering the Threads: Developing a
Methodology for Researching and Rebuilding Indigenous Legal Traditions, 1 LAKEHEAD
L.J. 17 (2015) (Can.) [hereinafter Gathering the Threads]; John Borrows, With or Without
You: First Nations Law (in Canada), 41 MCGILL L.J. 629 (1996) (Can.) [hereinafter With or
Without You]; John Borrows, Heroes, Tricksters, Monsters, and Caretakers: Indigenous
6
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also mindful of the experiences of other Indigenous legal scholars and
lawyers, such as Patricia Monture-Angus, 9 Tracey Lindberg, 10 James (Sakej)
Youngblood Henderson, 11 Robert Williams, 12 Aaron (Waabishki
Ma’iingan) Mills, 13 John Borrows, 14 Lindsay Borrows, 15 Gordon Christie, 16
Val Napoleon, 17 Karen Drake, 18 Jeffery Hewitt, 19 Harold Johnson, 20 Patricia
Barkaskas, 21 and Christine Zuni Cruz. 22

Law and Legal Education, 61 MCGILL L.J. 795 (2016) (Can.) [hereinafter Heroes and
Tricksters]; John Borrows, Outsider Education: Indigenous Law and Land-Based Learning,
33 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 1 (2016) (Can.) [hereinafter Outsider Education]; Patricia
Barkaskas & Sarah Buhler, Beyond Reconciliation: Decolonizing Clinical Legal Education,
26 J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 1 (2017) (Can.); Drake, supra note 4; Kirsten Anker, Teaching
‘Indigenous Peoples and the Law’: Whose Law?, 33 ALT. L.J. 132 (2008) (Aus.).
See, e.g., PATRICIA MONTURE-ANGUS, THUNDER IN MY SOUL: A MOHAWK WOMAN
9

SPEAKS (1995) (Can.).
See, e.g., Tracey Lindberg, Critical Indigenous Legal Theory Part 1: The Dialogue Within,
27 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 224 (2015) [hereinafter Critical Indigenous Legal Theory].
See, e.g., James (Sákéj) Youngblood Henderson, Postcolonial Indigenous Legal
Consciousness, 1 INDIGENOUS L.J. 1 (2002) (Can.).
See, e.g., Robert A. Williams, Jr., Vampires Anonymous and Critical Race Practice, 95
MICH. L. REV. 741 (1997).
See, e.g., Aaron James (Waabishki Ma’iingan) Mills, Driving the Gift Home, 33 WINDSOR
Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 167 (2016) (Can.) [hereinafter Driving the Gift Home]; The Lifeworlds
of Law, supra note 8.
See, e.g., JOHN BORROWS, DRAWING OUT LAW: A SPIRIT’S GUIDE (2010) (Can.).
See, e.g., LINDSAY KEEGITAH BORROWS, OTTER’S JOURNEY THROUGH INDIGENOUS
LANGUAGE AND LAW (2018) (Can.).
See, e.g., Gordon Christie, Culture, Self-Determination and Colonialism: Issues Around
the Revitalization of Indigenous Legal Traditions, 6 INDIGENOUS L.J. 13 (2007) (Can.).
See, e.g., Val Napoleon & Hadley Friedland, Indigenous Legal Traditions: Roots to
Renaissance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIM. L. 225 (Markus D. Dubber & Tatjana
Hörnle eds., 2014) (U.K.); An Inside Job, supra note 8; Gathering the Threads, supra note
8.
See, e.g., Drake, supra note 4.
See, e.g., Jeffery G. Hewitt, Decolonizing and Indigenizing: Some Considerations for Law
Schools, 33 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 65 (2016) (Can.).
See, e.g., HAROLD R. JOHNSON, PEACE AND GOOD ORDER: THE CASE FOR INDIGENOUS
JUSTICE IN CANADA (2019).
See, e.g., Barkaskas & Buhler, supra note 8.
See, e.g., Christine Zuni Cruz, [On the] Road Back In: Community Lawyering in
Indigenous Communities, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 229 (1999) [hereinafter Road Back In];
Christine Zuni Cruz, Four Questions on Critical Race Praxis: Lessons from Two Young
Lives in Indian Country, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2133 (2005) [hereinafter Four Questions];
Christine Zuni Cruz, Toward a Pedagogy and Ethic of Law/Lawyering for Indigenous
Peoples, 82 N.D. L. REV. 863 (2006) [hereinafter Toward a Pedagogy].
10
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These scholars identify several risks and barriers to the Indigenization of
Canadian legal education and practice, including: the distortion, severance,
mistranslation, and misappropriation of Indigenous legal orders; 23 racial
prejudice against Indigenous law students, faculty, and staff; 24 and the
preservation of settler-colonial supremacy and Western epistemologies,
ontologies, and pedagogies. 25 These risks remind us of the importance of
Indigenous epistemologies, ontologies, and cosmologies as the source of
Broadly, these risks include the internal distortion caused by the assimilation of nonIndigenous worldviews; external distortion caused by the recording of Indigenous legal
orders in non-Indigenous sources; the severance of Indigenous legal orders from their
epistemological, ontological, and cosmological foundations; and the risk that Indigenous
legal orders may be interpreted incompletely or incorrectly. See Christie, supra note 16;
FINCH, supra note 7, at 34–35; Outsider Education, supra note 8; Henderson, supra note
11; Drake, supra note 4, at 20–21 (on language, interpretation, and translation); Aimée Craft,
Living Treaties, Breathing Research, 26 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 15 (2014) (on language,
interpretation, and translation); Critical Indigenous Legal Theory, supra note 10, at 229,
233–34, 242, 245 (on the challenge of interpreting and translating Indigenous legal orders).
Some communities also oppose recording Indigenous legal orders in writing. See JOHN
BORROWS, RECOVERING CANADA: THE RESURGENCE OF INDIGENOUS LAW 15 (2002).
There is the risk that Indigenous legal orders and liberal constitutionalisms are fundamentally
incommensurable. See generally Aaron James Mills (Waabishki Ma’iingan), Miinigowiziwin:
23

All That Has Been Given for Living Well Together: One Vision of Anishinaabe
Constitutionalism (2019) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Victoria) (Can.) [hereinafter All
That
Has
Been
Given],
https://dspace.library.uvic.ca/bitstream/handle/1828/10985/Mills_Aaron_PhD_2019.pdf?s
equence=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/Y585-36X5]. Finally, courts currently limit
Indigenous legal orders as evidence, rather than according them judicial notice as a nondomestic legal system. BRUCE GRANVILLE MILLER, ORAL HISTORY ON TRIAL:
RECOGNIZING ABORIGINAL NARRATIVES IN THE COURTS 106–09 (2012) (Can.) (on
Indigenous legal orders as evidence of practice, customs, and traditions). However, Val
Napoleon and Hadley Friedland argue that Indigenous legal orders are robust enough to
withstand the distorting potential of Eurocentric education and settler colonialism. As they
put it, “[w]hat we do not want to do is let these critical questions paralyze us into inaction.
Narratives of fragility or incommensurability related to Indigenous laws are narratives of
colonialism. The stories, and the elders and communities we have learned from, all teach us
that Indigenous laws are made of stronger stuff.” An Inside Job, supra note 8, at 754.
See, e.g., Scott J. Franks, Towards Implementing the Truth and Reconciliation
24

Commission’s Calls to Action in Law Schools: A Settler Harm Reduction Approach to Racial
Stereotyping and Prejudice Against Indigenous Peoples and Indigenous Legal Orders in
Canadian Legal Education (2020) (LL.M. thesis, York University); Tracey Lindberg, What
Do You Call an Indian Woman with a Law Degree? Nine Aboriginal Women at the
University of Saskatchewan College of Law Speak Out, 9 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 301 (1997)
[hereinafter What Do You Call]. These experiences are consistent with the experiences of
Indigenous persons in Canadian society and higher education. See, e.g., Melanie A.
Morrison, Todd G. Morrison, Rebecca L. Harriman & Lisa M. Jewell, Old-Fashioned and
Modern Prejudice Toward Aboriginals in Canada, in THE PSYCH. OF MOD. PREJUDICE 277
(Melanie A. Morrison & Todd G. Morrison eds., 2008); Todd G. Morrison, Melanie A.
Morrison & Tomas Borsa, A Legacy of Derogation: Prejudice Toward Aboriginal Persons
in Canada, 5 PSYCH. 1001 (2014) [hereinafter A Legacy of Derogation].
See Christie, supra note 16, at 15–18; Henderson, supra note 11, at 16–19; All That Has
Been Given, supra note 23, at 3.
25
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Indigenous legal orders and as a basis for Indigenous legal education. 26 In
short, we should center decolonization in our activities. 27
II.

EDUCATION AND PRACTICE

I never wanted to be a lawyer. The Red River Métis, of which I am a
descendant, were dislocated and dispossessed in their homelands through
Canadian constitutional law and its enforcement by the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police—and, likely, plenty of lawyers. 28 In my hometown, the only
lawyer I had a favourable view of was Harold Johnson—and he has recently
written an apology for his participation in the legal system as a crown
prosecutor and criminal defence lawyer. 29 However, before law school, I was
an Indigenous policy and programming consultant. I understood that law
seemed to authorise or ground every policy issue impacting Indigenous
peoples. That is why I went to law school, to learn more about how law
impacts policy.
At a law school admissions event, I met a bencher 30 from a provincial
law society. 31 At some point in the conversation, the bencher asked me,
“Which one of your parents is Indian?” “That’s not how it works,” I
responded frankly. I explained that both of my parents are Métis, but I
All That Has Been Given, supra note 23. John Borrows describes, for example, the
importance of Indigenous legal categories in our descriptions of Indigenous law. See Heroes
and Tricksters, supra note 8. Lindsay Borrows describes how the principle of
dabaadendiziwin, or humility, can be applied in legal education. See Lindsay Borrows,
Dabaadendiziwin: Practices of Humility in a Multi-Juridical Legal Landscape, 33 WINDSOR
Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 149 (2016) (Can.). I believe this principle recognizes the relational and
emotional aspects of learning. Mi’kmaq educator Marie Battiste describes an approach that
engages learners, including settlers, in a reflexive process that engages their spiritual,
intellectual, emotional, and physical selves. See MARIE BATTISTE, DECOLONIZING
EDUCATION: NOURISHING THE LEARNING SPIRIT 66–69, 160–63, 176 (2013) (Can.).
Hewitt, supra note 19, at 67–71. The Article defines decolonization as the dismantling of
racial and settler-colonial hierarchies embedded in the rule of law. Tuck and Yang define
decolonization as the repatriation or rematriation of Indigenous land and life and the
transformation of Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples’ relationship outside of settler
colonialism. See Eve Tuck & K. Wayne Yang, Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor, 1
DECOLONIZATION: INDIGENEITY, EDUC. & SOC’Y 1, 21, 35 (2012). For Hewitt,
decolonization in Canadian legal education “is the complicated work of acknowledging
historic and ongoing wrongdoings along with claiming responsibility through naming,
dismantling, countering and neutralizing both the collective and individual assertions and
assumptions made in relation to Indigenous peoples.” Hewitt, supra note 19, at 70.
See M. Gouldhawke, A Condensed History of Canada’s Colonial Cops, NEW INQUIRY
(Mar. 10, 2020), https://thenewinquiry.com/a-condensed-history-of-canadas-colonial-cops/
[https://perma.cc/TM3U-J23Z].
JOHNSON, supra note 20.
American readers may be unfamiliar with the term “bencher.” For a detailed description,
see LAW SOC’Y OF ONT., Benchers, (Can.), https://lso.ca/about-lso/governance/benchers
[https://perma.cc/72WH-A6ZG].
This event occurred on January 29, 2013, at 6:00 PM at 1128 West Georgia Street in
Vancouver, British Columbia.
26
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could see that his interest in the conversation was quickly diminishing.
Perhaps he felt uncomfortable with my reply. The bencher’s question may
have relied on racialized stereotypes about Indigenous identity and could
have demonstrated a lack of knowledge about Indigenous nationhood and
citizenship. 32 When the bencher asked me, “Which one of your parents is
Indian?” he appeared to be collapsing meaningful legal and social
categories—Indigenous, First Nations, status Indian, mixed-ancestry, and
Métis—into one broader racial category—Indian. 33 His question also seemed
to disclose that I was white-passing in that context; I was not “prototypical”
of the racialized stereotype of an “Indian.” 34 The fact that I am racialized as
white (or mixed) in certain contexts is important. As a young person in
northern Saskatchewan, I was racialized as a person of mixed-settler and
Indigenous ancestry. 35 When I moved southeast, I found that I was
identified by others as white more often than as Indigenous or Métis. Since
my Métis identity has always been important to me, I would emphasize my
background whenever it was relevant.
Recently, there has been a refocusing on non-Indigenous persons,
often racialized as white, who mistakenly or fraudulently claim Indigenous
identity. 36 In response, some individuals accused of falsely claiming
Indigeneity reply that they are “metis,” in the sense that they are mixed-race.
As a Métis person, these replies are offensive and risk further confusing
settlers—like the bencher I met—about the differences between Indigeneity
and race.

For a discussion of processes of social categorization, see MARY E. KITE & BERNARD E.
WHITLEY, JR., PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION 87 (3d ed. 2016). For a
discussion of processes of racialization, see MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL
FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S 55–56 (2d ed. 1994).
Chelsea Vowel addresses the interplay between these two processes in CHELSEA VOWEL,
INDIGENOUS WRITES: A GUIDE TO FIRST NATIONS, MÉTIS & INUIT ISSUES IN CANADA 1
(2016) (Can.). Other Indigenous law students similarly report being stereotyped on the basis
of race and gender. What Do You Call, supra note 24, at 303, 315.
For a sociological description of how a single racial category undermines distinct Indigenous
identities, see CHRIS ANDERSEN, “MÉTIS”: RACE, RECOGNITION, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
INDIGENOUS PEOPLEHOOD 26 (2014) (Can.).
KITE & WHITLEY, supra note 32, at 131–33.
I purposefully distinguish between race and ancestry.
In the 2010s, the Canadian art and literature scene was the focus of these false claims.
Joseph Boyden was among the most well-known examples of a person who is alleged to have
falsely claimed Indigenous identity. See, e.g., Cheryl Simon, Fraudulent Claims of
Indigeneity: Indigenous Nations Are the Identity Experts, THE CONVERSATION (Nov. 22,
2021), http://theconversation.com/fraudulent-claims-of-indigeneity-indigenous-nations-arethe-identity-experts-171470 [https://perma.cc/JRM8-Y6RG] (listing Cheyanne Turions,
Joseph Boyden, Michelle Latimer and Carrie Bourassa as people called out for fraudulently
holding positions by claiming Indigeneity).
32
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This distinction is becoming more relevant as law schools increasingly have
to interrogate the appropriateness of admissions and hiring criteria based
solely on self-identification (or, at best, lineal descent of any degree). 37
My point is that deeply embedded ideas about race continue to shape
the experiences of Indigenous faculty, staff, and students. Even though
Indigeneity is not a racial category, Indigenous persons are racialized in
Canadian society. 38 Canadian society remains highly prejudicial towards
Indigenous peoples and, in particular, Indigenous women and girls. 39 Race
remains the lens through which many Canadians understand Indigenous
identity. Thus, it should not come as any surprise that anti-Indigenous
racism reverberates in law schools. 40
Because I am racialized as white (or ambiguously mixed race), I rarely
experience overt racial discrimination. However, this is not the experience
of many racialized Indigenous law students. Indigenous law students are
often stereotyped by their peers and professors as lazy, militant, angry, or
See, e.g., University Launches Formal Investigation, UNIV. OF SASK. (Nov. 18, 2021),
https://news.usask.ca/articles/general/2021/university-launches-formal-investigation.php
[https://perma.cc/ZDP2-9EPQ] (announcing investigation into a professor’s representation
about her Indigenous identity); Office of the Provost and Vice-President (Academic),
Carleton Developing Indigenous-Specific Hiring Policy, CARLETON UNIV. (Dec. 7, 2021)
(Can.),
https://carleton.ca/provost/2021/carleton-developing-indigenous-specific-hiringpolicy/ [https://perma.cc/N3GN-KDFA] (“Carlton University is among those institutions that
are committing to collaboratively developing an Indigenous-specific hiring policy to protect
positions . . .”). The Faculty Association at Ryerson University has developed a
memorandum of understanding related to the hiring and advancement of Indigenous
professors and librarians that offers an alternative process, stating that an Indigenous faculty
member is a person who self-identifies as Indigenous and who demonstrates “lineage and/or
acceptance by an Indigenous community.” Memorandum of Understanding – 28: Hiring
and Evaluation of Indigenous Faculty Members and Librarians, Ryerson University (2021)
(Can.),
https://www.ryerson.ca/content/dam/faculty-affairs/rfa-collective-agreement/CA2020-2023/MOU-28.pdf [https://perma.cc/HL7Z-FR36]; see also Jennifer S. Simpson,
Universities and Claims to Indigenous Identity, RYERSON UNIV. (Nov. 15, 2021) (Can.),
https://www.ryerson.ca/provost/about/off-the-fence-blog/2021/11/universities-and-claims-toindigenous-identity/ [https://perma.cc/XUP9-CFBG].
The Indian Act relies on technocratic definitions that obfuscate an underlying racial logic.
See ANDERSEN, supra note 33, at 31; BRENNA BHANDAR, COLONIAL LIVES OF PROPERTY:
LAW, LAND, AND RACIAL REGIMES OF OWNERSHIP 4 (2018); GLEN SEAN COULTHARD, RED
SKIN, WHITE MASKS: REJECTING THE COLONIAL POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 41 (2014).
A Legacy of Derogation, supra note 24; NATIONAL INQUIRY INTO MISSING AND
MURDERED INDIGENOUS WOMEN AND GIRLS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INQUIRY INTO MISSING AND MURDERED INDIGENOUS WOMEN
AND GIRLS (2019), (Can.), https://www.deslibris.ca/ID/10100806 [https://perma.cc/JHY7UGUM]; Sherene H. Razack, Gendering Disposability, 28 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 285 (2016).
My colleague Angela Lee notes that this experience is not limited to law students. The
University of British Columbia interviewed Indigenous students and professors on their
experiences in higher education. The students who were interviewed spoke about traumatic
experiences in the classroom related to processes of racialization. How Do You Talk About
Indigenous Issues in the Classroom?, FIRST NATIONS & INDIGENOUS STUDIES, UNIV. OF
B.C. (2008) (Can.), https://intheclass.arts.ubc.ca/ [https://perma.cc/4ZLQ-4B4E].
37
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unintelligent. 41 The imposition of these racial stereotypes on Indigenous
students can have a profound effect on their law school experiences. Some
may feel the need to work two or three times harder than their nonIndigenous peers to disprove negative stereotypes or presumptions of
competence held about them. 42 A student faced with these stereotypes might
feel tokenized or essentialized.
Although I never felt a need to conceal my identity, I acknowledge that
for others it can be a means to avoid discrimination or to acculturate to a
different sort of identity, whether cultural or professional. 43 There are a
variety of reasons why students may choose to do this: some may be the first
in their family or community to attend law school, 44 while others may choose
to disassociate from their Indigeneity or their interests in the practice of
Indigenous or Aboriginal law. 45 Within Indigenous student cohorts, issues
of belonging and identification can undermine solidarity and mutual
support.
When not appropriately contextualized, some educational content can
also replicate racial stereotypes in the classroom and cause harm to
Indigenous students. 46 Indigenous students may be called upon by their
professors to speak on issues related to Canadian Aboriginal law,
Indigenous legal orders, or the Indigenous perspective, which can be a

What Do You Call, supra note 24, at 313; MONTURE-ANGUS, supra note 9, at 35. Although
these accounts are dated, they remain consistent with what I have heard from my racialized
peers.
Critical Indigenous Legal Theory, supra note 10, at 233; Road Back In, supra note 22, at
872, 878.
For a description of how Indigenous law students negotiate their professional and
community identities, see Sonia Lawrence & Signa A. Daum Shanks, Indigenous Lawyers in
Canada: Identity, Professionalization, Law, 38 DALHOUSIE L.J. 503 (2015).
“She said being first is hard on the soul of that first person, because it is like we are put
through a sieve not made for us.” Toward a Pedagogy, supra note 22, at 867.
MONTURE-ANGUS, supra note 9, at 66. For example, to advance in their career, some
Indigenous law students may choose not to identify and may choose to complete coursework
that is consistent with a more traditional legal education. Heroes and Tricksters, supra note
8, at 806.
Lindberg describes how Canadian legal education disembodies the law from Indigenous
peoples’ social reality through fact patterns: “This is my personhood, and we are
dismembering it. Its main organs are taken out: the facts, the issues, and the ratio.” What Do
You Call, supra note 24, at 318. In 2019, a law professor at the University of Toronto
assigned a fact pattern involving the apprehension of an Indigenous child from their family.
Joe Friesen, University of Toronto Law School Dean Apologizes for Assignment That Used
‘Troubling’ Indigenous Stereotypes, GLOBE & MAIL (Dec. 12, 2019), (Can.),
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-university-of-toronto-law-school-deanapologizes-for-assignment-that/ [https://perma.cc/5UL9-VNQG]. The context of the
apprehension involved parental drug and alcohol use, the failure of the parents to attend
programs, and the grandmother’s positive engagement with the child. Id. The assignment
recalled stereotypes and “old-fashioned” prejudices about Indigenous families. Id. The Dean
apologized for the assignment and its impact on Indigenous law students. Id.
41
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tokenizing experience. 47 In some cases, these experiences, even when
solicited from Indigenous students in the classroom, may be dismissed. 48
Some Indigenous students will expend emotional labour managing
emotions like anger, discomfort, or anxiety on the part of their nonIndigenous peers and professors. 49 They may be ignored or patronized. 50
Administrators might saddle an Indigenous law student with additional
academic work to help them “succeed” in law school when what they really
need is “life support.” 51 If a student is successful in school, their nonIndigenous peers may perceive those successes to be unmerited. 52 Some
Indigenous students may consciously or unconsciously contort their
thinking to accord with a Eurocentric perspective. 53 Others will resist the
imposition of a Eurocentric worldview. 54 Some will burn out or withdraw
from school. 55
The agency of settler institutions, professors, and students must be
centered in the replication and imposition of prejudice and stereotyping.
Indigenous law students are not inadequate or damaged. 56 For example,
Monture-Angus rejects the pathologization of Indigenous students and
professors as disadvantaged without identifying the cause of that
“disadvantage”: “Disadvantage is a nice, soft, comfortable word to describe
dispossession, to describe a situation of force whereby our very existence,
our histories, are erased continuously right before our eyes. Words like
‘disadvantage’ conceal racism.” 57 Indigenous law students are, in many cases,
answering important questions about themselves and their relationships to
their community and the legal profession. 58 At the same time, they are
navigating an environment—and a legal order—that is sometimes prejudicial
to them.
Many law students, including me, end up Indigenizing their own
education. 59 If they are fortunate, they might have the support of an
47
48
49
50
51

What Do You Call, supra note 24, at 307, 319.
MONTURE-ANGUS, supra note 9, at 20.
Id. at 18–19; What Do You Call, supra note 24, at 319.
What Do You Call, supra note 24, at 314, 319.
JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 25 (referring to “life support” as things like “reliable daycare,

affordable transportation and health services”).
Cherie D. Werhun & April J. Penner, The Effects of Stereotyping and Implicit Theory on
Benevolent Prejudice Toward Aboriginal Canadians, 40 J. APPL. SOC. PSYCHOL. 899, 911
(2010).
JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 20.
Driving the Gift Home, supra note 13, at 868.
Id. at 819; What Do You Call, supra note 24, at 320; Critical Indigenous Legal Theory,
supra note 10, at 233; Toward a Pedagogy, supra note 22, at 872.
Eve Tuck, Suspending Damage: A Letter to Communities, 79 HARV. EDUC. REV. 409
(2009).
MONTURE-ANGUS, supra note 9, at 14, 21.
What Do You Call, supra note 24, at 322; Lawrence & Daum Shanks, supra note 43; Road
Back In, supra note 22; Williams, supra note 12.
The Lifeworlds of Law, supra note 8, at 850.
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Indigenous faculty member. 60 Before law school, I completed the Program
of Legal Studies for Native People (“PLSNP”) at the University of
Saskatchewan. For two months during the PLSNP, I learned about
Nehiyawak wiyasiwêwina from Elder Wes Fineday in Treaty 6 Territory. As
a Métis person from Treaty 6 Adhesion Territory, these teachings resonated
with me. I hoped to continue this education in Indigenous law when I
accepted an offer at Osgoode Hall Law School (commonly referred to as
Osgoode) in Toronto, Ontario.
However, when I started law school in 2013, Osgoode did not offer a
course in Indigenous law. 61 Like others before me, I had to seek out other
opportunities to learn the kind of material and skills that I believed were
necessary to practice in or for Indigenous communities. 62 In my second year,
I helped organize the first annual Anishinaabe law camp at
Neyaashiinigmiing, where John Borrows and community members from
the Chippewas of Nawash Unceded First Nation taught us about
Anishinaabe inakonigewin. 63 I also participated in the Kawskimhon
Aboriginal Law Moot, a moot based in part on Indigenous dispute
resolution practice. I also completed a placement with the Metis Settlement
Appeal Tribunal in Edmonton, Alberta, through an intensive course in
Indigenous Lands, Resources, and Governance. 64 These experiences were
essential to my well-being and success in law school. But Indigenizing the
curriculum might not be sufficient for ensuring the success of other
Indigenous law students and professors, or for facilitating some of the
normative objectives underlying critical Indigenous legal theory.
I feel that it is probably more common for an Indigenous law student and their Indigenous
professor to take on the additional work of Indigenizing the student’s learning. This is not
always the case. At Osgoode, I was incredibly fortunate to have the support of nonIndigenous Professors Andrée Boisselle, Shin Imai, and Brian Slattery.
Osgoode now offers courses on Indigenous legal orders. Indigenous law is not a mandatory
course, but students are required to take at least one course on Aboriginal law or Indigenous
legal issues and perspectives.
The Lifeworlds of Law, supra note 8, at 850.
The Anishinaabe Law Camp, OSGOODE HALL L. SCH. OF YORK UNIV., (Can.),
https://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/programs/juris-doctor/experiential-education/anishinaabelaw-camp/ [https://perma.cc/3X2C-QVC9]. For student reflections on the Anishinaabe law
camp, see Serena Dykstra, Zachary D’Onofrio & Jasleen Johal, Anishinaabe Law Camp,
OBITER DICTA (Sept. 29, 2014), (Can.), https://obiter-dicta.ca/2014/09/29/anishinaabe-lawcamp/ [https://perma.cc/3LX5-8HDK]; Allison Grandish, Anishinaabe Law Camp 2015:
The Stories Behind the Law, OBITER DICTA, (Oct. 13, 2015), (Can.), https://obiterdicta.ca/2015/10/13/anishinaabe-law-camp-2015/ [https://perma.cc/RBU5-WCVH].
For information on the Kawaskimhon Aboriginal law moot, see Kawaskimhon National
Aboriginal
Moot,
OSGOODE
HALL
L.
SCH.
OF
YORK
UNIV.,
https://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/programs/juris-doctor/jd-program/mooting-lawyeringskills/kawaskimhon-national-aboriginal-moot/
[https://perma.cc/RB5W-WPKF].
For
information on the Intensive in Indigenous Lands, Resources and Governance, see Intensive
Program in Indigenous Lands, Resources & Governments, OSGOODE HALL L. SCH. OF
YORK
UNIV.,
(Can.),
https://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/programs/juris-doctor/jdprogram/clinics-intensives/indigenous-intensive/ [https://perma.cc/LU27-X728].
60
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In mid-October 2015, shortly after the release of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission’s report into Indian Residential Schools in
Canada, the Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice (“CIAJ”)
held its annual conference on the banks of the South Saskatchewan River. 65
The title of the conference, “We Are All Here to Stay,” repeated the
memetic closing line of Chief Justice Lamer’s reasons in Delgamuukw v.
British Columbia. 66 No more apt statement of settler futurity may ever be
spoken. 67 In his opening address, Saskatoon Tribal Council Chief Felix
Thomas challenged the meaning of the conference’s theme. 68 For Chief
Thomas, “being here to stay” meant the over-incarceration and
criminalization of Indigenous peoples. 69 “Here,” Chief Thomas explained,
“means in jail.” 70 He offered an alternative interpretation based on treaty
principles that the conference should be about “gathering together” to
reflect not only on Canadian law about Indigenous peoples but also
Indigenous realities, life, and legal orders. 71 Justice LaForme shared Chief
Thomas’s concern, adding that “we are all here to stay, but not in the same
way.” 72 Justice LaForme appeared hopeful that change was possible. 73 He
reflected that “we have moved on from hearing ‘there is no such thing as
CAN. INST. FOR THE ADMIN. OF JUST., 2015 ANNUAL CONFERENCE: ABORIGINAL PEOPLES
LAW: “WE ARE ALL HERE TO STAY” (2015), https://ciaj-icaj.ca/wpcontent/uploads/page/2016/07/2015-aboriginal-peoples-and-law.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PS5K-YEYY].
Delgamuukw v. B.C., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 1124 (Can.). In R. v. Bloom, Justice Green
comments how “[t]hese final words achieved a meme-like status in the critical commentary
that followed Delgamuukw.” [2016] O.N.C.J. 8, 11 (Can.).
This theory of reconciliation is premised on the Crown’s assumed sovereignty and
Indigenous acquiescence to the Crown’s interests. Michael Asch writes that “what at first
blush reads as an open-ended process becomes one based on this singular pre-condition: the
agreement on the part of Indigenous peoples that the scope of their political rights, and in
particular their right to self-determination, is circumscribed by the fact that, at the end of the
day, whatever rights they may have are subordinate to the legislative authority of the Canadian
state.” MICHAEL ASCH, ON BEING HERE TO STAY: TREATIES AND ABORIGINAL RIGHTS IN
CANADA 11 (2014).
CAN. INST. FOR THE ADMIN. OF JUST., Aboriginal Peoples and Law: We Are All Here to
Stay, 2015 Annual Conference, at 52:18 (Oct. 14, 2015), https://ciajicaj.ca/en/library/videos/annual-conferences/#goto-2015-aboriginal-peoples-and-law-we-areall-here-to-stay [https://perma.cc/SK4H-7YTK] [hereinafter 2015 Annual Conference
Video].
Id. at 54:02.
Id.; Scott Franks, Notes on Aboriginal Peoples and Law: We Are All Here to Stay,
Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice, 2015 Annual Conference, in WE ARE
ALL HERE TO STAY (2015) (on file with author).
2015 Annual Conference Video, supra note 68, at 54:17.
Franks, supra note 70.
Sean Fine, Harry LaForme, a Groundbreaking Indigenous Judge, Looks Back in Anger at
the Milestone Canada Missed, GLOBE & MAIL (Nov. 22, 2018), (Can.),
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-harry-laforme-a-pioneering-indigenousjudge-looks-back-in-anger-at/ [https://perma.cc/K3MA-CFV6].
65
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sovereignty’ [among non-Aboriginal lawyers and judges] to reconciliation
and the kinds of discussions that we are having here [at this conference].” 74
For me, the conference was like a rock concert of Indigenous legal
scholarship. Over eighty judges heard some of the most renowned
Indigenous scholars chart a path towards respecting Indigenous legal orders
in Canadian courts. 75 As part of the highlights, John Borrows laid out
arguments for taking judicial notice of Indigenous stories as sources of law.
Aimée Craft shared her community-based work on Anishinaabe nibi
inaakonigewin, or Anishinaabe water law, in Manitoba and Northwestern
Ontario. Jeffery Hewitt and Caleb Behn tailored their presentations to
incorporate Indigenous and non-Indigenous ways of understanding,
challenging listeners’ assumptions about the supremacy of the western
philosophy and the (in)validity of Indigenous legal orders. How could the
participants not come away with a greater understanding of the importance
of Indigenous laws to the rule of law in Canada? 76
During Behn’s presentation, a participant commented on how justices
are sworn to uphold the rule of law. 77 The participant was responding to
Behn’s position that Indigenous peoples’ resistance to extractive industries
is authorized under Indigenous law. 78 A possible subtext to the participant’s
comment was Behn’s relationship to George Behn, Behn’s great
grandfather and defendant in Behn v. Moulton Contracting Ltd. 79 In Behn,
the Supreme Court of Canada did not consider whether the Behn family
was authorized under Indigenous law to oppose Moulton Contracting’s
activities on their land. 80 Noting that the Behn family’s actions were not
authorized by the Indian Act band council, the Court characterised George
Behn’s actions as “self-help remedies” that would “bring the administration

Franks, supra note 70.
Some of these speakers included Val Napoleon, Maria Campbell, Kimberly Murray, Jason
Madden, Marilyn Poitras, and Winona Wheeler. Sylvia McAdam Saysewahum joined from
the audience; her questions to Chief Justice McLachlin were, however, not answered. See
2015 Annual Conference Video, supra note 68.
Borrows argues that Indigenous law is one of three legal orders that comprises the rule of
law in Canada. JOHN BORROWS, CANADA’S INDIGENOUS CONSTITUTION 23 (2010). The
rule of law in Canada is often presented as consisting only of European—French and
English—systems of legal thought. For a discussion of this limited view of the rule of law, see
The Lifeworlds of Law, supra note 8, at 852–53.
Caleb Behn, President & Exec. Dir., Keepers of the Water, Indigenous Peoples and the
Environment, Presentation at the Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice Annual
Conference: Aboriginal Peoples and the Law: “We Are All Here to Stay” (Oct. 15, 2015).
74
75

76

77

78

Id.

[2013] 2 S.C.R. 227 (Can.).
Because of the nature of the litigation, the Supreme Court of Canada did not consider the
Indigenous law argument to be relevant (though it did acknowledge the argument). Id. at
235. In my view, the Supreme Court’s narrowing of the issue to abuse of process assumes
that the Behn family’s decision to rely on their rights under Indigenous law to block
Moulton’s access was not a valid legal avenue.
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of justice into disrepute.” 81 In short, the Court reasoned that the Behn
family’s actions were lawless. In the context of the panel’s discussion, the
participants’ comments implied that Indigenous legal orders were outside,
or disorderly, to the Canadian rule of law. I was stunned. Were we even
attending the same conference?
By the third conference day, many of the other Indigenous law
students had left. I stayed because I hoped that the then-Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Canada, Beverly McLachlin, would call upon the justices
to thoughtfully consider the application of Indigenous law in her keynote
speech. After all, only a few months prior, she had described Canada’s
colonial policies towards Indigenous peoples as “cultural genocide.”82
Unfortunately, the Chief Justice’s speech was very light on the theme of the
conference. She spoke at length about the “access to justice” problem,
which she characterized as Indigenous peoples’ distrust and lack of
knowledge of the Canadian justice system rather than as the system’s own
unresponsiveness to Indigenous legal perspectives or embedded prejudice. 83
Finally, towards the end of her speech, the Chief Justice touched on the
need for judicial education on Indigenous history, legal traditions, and
customary laws. 84 However, her remarks centred on “alleviat[ing] the
alienation experienced by many First Nations people involved in the legal
system” and their “empower[ment] . . . to participate more fully in its
processes” and not on the application of, or deference to, Indigenous legal
orders in Canadian law. 85 Instead of locating the primary responsibility to
take action on justices, she noted the absence of Indigenous lawyers and
Id. at 246. This logic was followed at the trial level in Foxgate Developments. Foxgate
Developments Inc. v. Doe, 2020 ONSC 6529 at paras. 107–08 (CanLII) (Can.).
Sean Fine, Chief Justice Says Canada Attempted ‘Cultural Genocide’ on Aboriginals,
GLOBE
&
MAIL
(May
28,
2015),
(Can.),
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/chief-justice-says-canada-attemptedcultural-genocide-on-aboriginals/article24688854/ [https://perma.cc/QU6D-A2PU].
Beverely McLachlin, Chief Justice of Canada, Remarks at the Canadian Institute for the
Administration of Justice Annual Conference: Aboriginal Peoples and the Law: “We Are
All Here to Stay” (Oct. 16, 2015), in CAN. INST. FOR ADMIN. JUST.: PAPERS & ARTICLES,
https://ciaj-icaj.ca/wp-content/uploads/documents/2015/10/916.pdf?id=472
[https://perma.cc/MK7H-2GKT]. The speech is formulaic in its description of access to
justice. The first half of the speech is not tailored or responsive to Indigenous peoples’
experiences in the justice system—it could have been written for any audience. The Chief
Justice’s remarks on Indigenous peoples’ distrust of, and therefore their failure to access, the
legal system, ignores the reality that Indigenous peoples have consistently turned to the law
for redress. Instead, the speech walks a thin line between the state’s acceptance of its
responsibility for disentitling Indigenous peoples’ access to legal redress and shifting this
burden of access entirely onto Indigenous peoples—making them responsible for any
“mistrust” they might have towards that system. Each of the reasons the Chief Justice gives
for this mistrust—a “clash of cultures” or geographical isolation—centre Indigenous peoples’
responsibility or position.
Id. at 10–11.
Id. at 11.
81
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justices and suggested that there was a lack of engagement among
communities in advancing their Indigenous legal orders in Canadian
courts. 86
At the time, I felt that the Chief Justice could have said more. It felt
like a lost opportunity, given the strength of the Indigenous scholars at the
conference. I remember thinking: you have hundreds of judges and lawyers

in this room right now who can learn how to engage with Indigenous law if
you’d only tell them that it’s OK. The conference’s theme, “We Are All

Here to Stay” posed a challenge to the participants: “What does it mean to
be ‘here to stay’”? One possible answer challenges the supremacy of settler
interests in our collective understanding of the rule of law in Canada, as
demonstrated by the application of an Indigenous legal order in a case such
as Behn or as presently is the case in Wet’suwet’en territory. 87 The other
answer is an iteration on the status quo: being here to stay in the same way.
To me, it appeared that an important barrier to Indigenization and
decolonization of Canadian legal education was the perseverance of an
ideology rooted in settler colonialism and an affective commitment to its
future. What I learned in law school is that racism is not the whole story.
Canadian law is deeply invested in ensuring the future allocation of
resources to settlers. Even seemingly progressive notions (such as
reconciliation) or activities (such as the integration of Indigenous legal
orders) manifest in this context of a perceived threat to settler futurity. 88
Racism facilitates a deeper ideology of settler colonialism.
III.

TEACHING

I joined the Lincoln Alexander School of Law in 2020. As a new
assistant professor, I have felt welcomed in my work on Indigenizing the
first-year curriculum. I want to say this up front because I genuinely
Id. at 12. Here, again, the Chief Justice places the responsibility on Indigenous peoples to
engage with the Canadian legal system. In describing some areas of judicial reform, she notes
that these activities “do not fundamentally change the way that the justice system interacts
with Aboriginal people,” though it might “promise to alleviate the alienation experienced by
many First Nations people involved in the legal system, and empower them to participate
more fully in its processes.” Id. at 11. It is unclear whether she is aware that there are
hundreds, if not more, Indigenous persons trained in Canadian law. The Indigenous Law
Centre Summer Program at the University of Saskatchewan graduated hundreds of
Indigenous law students, some of whom went onto receive law degrees and enter the
profession. About the Summer Program, INDIGENOUS LAW CTR., (Can.),
https://indigenouslaw.usask.ca/ilc-summerprogram.php#TheSummerPrograminPropertyandCustomaryLaw
[https://perma.cc/X2MV-99HF]. At the CIAJ’s conference, there were at least four
Indigenous justices: Justices Gerald Morin, Tony Mandamin, Murray Sinclair, and Harry
LaForme. See 2015 Annual Conference Video, supra note 68. I attended the conference
with at least eight other Indigenous law students.
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R 1010, 1111 (Can.).
For a discussion of the concept of “settler futurity” see Tuck & Yang, supra note 27, at 14.
86
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appreciate the faculty, staff, and students at our school. Like many Canadian
law schools, our school is committed to the implementation of the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission’s Call to Action 28. In this section, I want
to share some of my thoughts on implementing the Calls in the context of
Indigenous legal education, more broadly defined, in Canadian law schools.
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s Final Report and Calls
to Action have had a significant impact on Indigenization activities in
Canadian legal education. Three Calls attend to the need for cultural
competency and Aboriginal and Indigenous law training for law students
and legal professionals, and for the creation of Indigenous law institutes:

27. We call upon the Federation of Law Societies of Canada to
ensure that lawyers receive appropriate cultural competency
training, which includes the history and legacy of residential
schools, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, Treaties and Aboriginal rights, Indigenous
law, and Aboriginal–Crown relations. This will require skillsbased training in intercultural competency, conflict resolution,
human rights, and anti-racism.
28. We call upon law schools in Canada to require all students to
take a course in Aboriginal people and the law, which includes
the history and legacy of residential schools, the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Treaties and
Aboriginal rights, Indigenous law, and Aboriginal-Crown
relations. This will require skills-based training in intercultural
competency, conflict resolution, human rights, and anti-racism.
....
50. In keeping with the United Nations Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples, we call upon the federal government, in
collaboration with Aboriginal organizations, to fund the
establishment of Indigenous law institutes for the development,
use, and understanding of Indigenous laws and access to justice
in accordance with the unique cultures of Aboriginal peoples in
Canada. 89
Canadian law schools have responded with a variety of formal and
informal initiatives intended to implement the Calls. 90
CALLS TO ACTION, supra note 5, at 3, 5–6.
For a summary of each law school’s progress on the implementation of the Calls, see
Reconciliation Initiatives & Responses to the TRC Report in Canadian Law Schools,
COUNCIL
CAN.
LAW
DEANS
(2018),
https://ccld-cdfdc.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2018/07/CCLD-TRC-REPORT-V2.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2W7-SNW5];
Reconciliation Initiatives & Responses to the TRC Report in Canadian Law Schools,
COUNCIL
CAN.
LAW
DEANS
(2021),
https://ccld-cdfdc.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2021/07/2021-TRC-Positions-of-Canadian-Universities-June-2021Copy.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6XU-XSF5].
89
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In my capacity as a faculty member, I am now trying to decide how to
do this work, which raises myriad questions. The structure, content, and
delivery of courses is one consideration. Should Indigenous legal orders be
taught in a mandatory course? 91 How might we respond to arguments from
faculty that a mandatory course interferes with academic freedom? 92 Should
Indigenous law, issues, and perspectives also be integrated throughout the
curriculum? 93 How do we ensure that Indigenous legal education is not
sequestered to one week in an integrated, or segregated to one mandatory,
course? 94 Should students be required to take a course in constitutional law,
legal theory, or Aboriginal law before they take a course in Indigenous law? 95
Should students receive preparatory education in the history of settler
colonialism, Indigenous and settler relationships, or residential schools
before they attend a course on Indigenous law? 96 Should students be
required to learn about Indigenous epistemologies, ontologies,
cosmologies, and ethics before they learn about a specific Indigenous legal
order? 97
Whether mandatory or elective, or both, what should the content of
such a course be? What are the pedagogical objectives of such a course? 98
Should a course on Indigenous law address Indigenous legal theories and
methodologies, multiple Indigenous legal orders in a comparative form, or
a single Indigenous legal order? If an Indigenous legal order is taught,
should they be those of the territory where the school is located, or those of
the educator’s home territory? 99 How should our courses reflect the
guidance of Indigenous communities and elders? 100 Should certain content

Drake, supra note 4, at 26–27.
For a reply, see id. at 12.
It can be both mandatory and integrated: Id. at 26–27.
If Indigenous laws are integrated in the curriculum without a mandatory course, students—
and professors—might struggle to make sense of those laws. Miscategorization,
disconnection, abstraction, and potentially even subjugation are risks in this context. For a
discussion of some of these risks. See id. at 27.
The Lifeworlds of Law, supra note 8, at 870.
See id. at 869–70.
Id. at 871.
Drake’s mandatory course on Anishinaabe law had two objectives: first, to illustrate that
Anishinaabe law is law, how to discern law from Indigenous sources, and how to apply
Indigenous law in practice; and second, to “equip students with the tools to set aside their
own ontology, epistemology, ethic, and logic and begin to grasp the Indigenous ontology,
epistemology, ethic and logic that give rise to the Indigenous laws at issue.” Drake, supra
note 4, at 22.
Drake proposes that students should be taught the Indigenous legal order of the territory
in which the educator and students are located: Id. at 23. We might also ask how the legal
order of the host territory might direct an educator in this choice. See id.
An Elders’ advisory circle may help guide the Indigenization and decolonization of law
schools, including courses. Hewitt, supra note 19, at 81.
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be excluded? 101 More fundamentally, how should the structure or delivery
of the course uphold Indigenous legal orders or reflect an Indigenous
pedagogical practice? 102 Should we prioritize materials written or spoken by
Indigenous persons? 103 What evaluation methods, if any, should be used in
a course on Indigenous law? 104 Are final exams inconsistent with Indigenous
epistemologies? 105 Are reflective journals more appropriate? 106 Can we
reconcile the grade curve with Indigenous epistemologies? 107
It is also necessary to consider the experiences of both Indigenous and
non-Indigenous students in the classroom. How do we ensure that the
classroom is safe for Indigenous students while also creating space for nonIndigenous students to unsettle themselves? 108 Should we consider
Indigenous law student cohorts in the classroom? How might an educator
offer support for Indigenous law students within or outside of the
classroom? How might an educator support or enable self-reflection and
introspection among non-Indigenous students on some of the assumptions
they might carry about Indigenous peoples and Indigenous legal orders?
Indigenous faculty are often called upon to teach not only Canadian
Aboriginal law, but many other areas of state law, including property,
contracts, or torts. This leads to a consideration of resourcing, capacity,
competency, and institutional objectives. Who is competent to teach
Indigenous legal education? Should it be limited to Indigenous faculty
members or community members? How do we ensure that educators—
Indigenous or not—have adequate support and training to integrate
Indigenous legal education in their courses or teach a course on Indigenous
law? 109 Should Indigenous faculty members be responsible for providing this
support to non-Indigenous colleagues in their efforts to integrate the
curriculum? 110 If so, how might Indigenous faculty be accommodated or
compensated, if at all, for this bijural role? If Indigenous community
members teach, should the institution or the professor pay them for their
HADLEY LOUISE FRIEDLAND, THE WETIKO LEGAL PRINCIPLES: CREE AND ANISHINABEK
RESPONSES TO VIOLENCE AND VICTIMIZATION 13 (2018) (Can.).
For a discussion of Indigenous pedagogies in a Anishinaabe law course, see Drake, supra
note 4, at 28–30; The Lifeworlds of Law, supra note 8. Mills discusses, for example, how
Anishinaabe law structures when in the year certain content can be discussed. Id. at 873.
The Lifeworlds of Law, supra note 8, at 876.
See Drake, supra note 4, at 30.
See id. at 30.
See Barkaskas & Buhler, supra note 8, at 8.
Road Back In, supra note 22, at 268.
Tuck & Yang, supra note 27, at 21. See also Eve Tuck & K. Wayne Yang, Series Editors’
Introduction, in INDIGENOUS AND DECOLONIZING STUDIES IN EDUCATION: MAPPING THE
LONG VIEW x–xxi, xiv (Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Eve Tuck & K. Wayne Yang eds., 2018)
[hereinafter MAPPING THE LONG VIEW] (providing a brief overview of efforts to decolonize
higher education).
Hewitt, supra note 19, at 72.
Hewitt reminds us that some institutions may “take more from Indigenous scholars and
Indigenous law students than from their non-Indigenous colleagues and students.” Id. at 78.
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labour? If so, how should that labour be valued? What is the role of nonIndigenous professors, staff, and students in Indigenous legal education? 111
A more difficult question is whether Indigenous legal orders should be
taught at all within the overarching structure of Canadian legal education? 112
What risks might exist—to Indigenous legal orders or communities—when
we implement Indigenous legal education without also undertaking
decolonization of Canadian legal education and practice? 113 These are just
some of the questions I am asking myself.
The pedagogical choices I have made during my time at Lincoln
Alexander reflect my ethical commitments as a Métis person who, for the
most part, sees Nehiyaw wiyasiwêwina as governing his life. 114 Like other
Canadian law schools, Lincoln Alexander offers a mandatory course in
Indigenous law. However, our current curriculum places Indigenous law
within a mandatory course on Aboriginal law, the Canadian law that
purports to apply to Indigenous peoples. This placement creates unique
challenges for Indigenous and non-Indigenous students alike.
On one hand, teaching and learning settler colonial law alongside
Indigenous law offers opportunities to critically assess and imagine
alternatives to the status quo. On the other, this juxtaposition risks
subjugating Indigenous law within a dominant, settler colonial worldview.
For some law students, this course marks their first time grappling with their
settler worldview as an object—as a lens through which they make sense of
the law and its relationship to society. 115 That can be a challenging thing for
some to grasp, especially since they will be doing this within a broader
curriculum that, in some cases, uncritically concretizes their dominant
worldview. Distortion, mistranslation, and false categorization are risks
when teaching Indigenous and colonial legal orders side by side, even
despite the best efforts of an educator. 116 I know it can be done because I
have had professors who have done this well, but the difficulties inherent in
the exercise are magnified for me as an early career professor. This
challenge leads me to believe that I should divide the content of the current
Aboriginal law and Indigenous law course into separate courses.
I am starting to think that if we require students to take a course on
Indigenous law, we should make it a stand-alone, substantive one. 117 I am
not convinced that Indigenous law should be taught trans-systemically or
Mills describes, for example, how non-Indigenous faculty can support Indigenous students
and their faculty colleagues in their efforts to teach and learn about Indigenous legal orders.
The Lifeworlds of Law, supra note 8, at 871.
Id. at 872; Hewitt, supra note 19, at 71–80.
Hewitt, supra note 19, at 71–80.
I am not fond of the “two-worlds” persona I am sometimes offered as a Métis person. That
said, my knowledge of Nehiyaw wiyasiwêwina is limited.
Road Back In, supra note 22, at 239.
On the challenges of mis-categorization, see Heroes and Tricksters, supra note 8, at 812.
I think Mills’ course on Anishinaabe rooted constitutionalism is one possible approach.
The Lifeworlds of Law, supra note 8.
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within a framework of legal pluralism. 118 I do recognize that a trans-systemic
or pluralistic approach has some benefits. For example, we may organize
our understanding of Indigenous legal orders according to trans-systemic
categories. In turn, a trans-systemic approach can make Indigenous legal
orders more approachable and cognizable to persons who are unfamiliar
with Indigenous epistemologies, cosmologies, and ontologies. 119 There is a
persuasive turn to this approach. 120 Yet, I am concerned that there are also
substantial risks, such as the mistranslation, severance, and distortion to
Indigenous legal orders mentioned above. 121 I am also concerned that courts
may apply—and counsel may argue for the application of—Indigenous law in
ways that sustain settler colonialism.
These risks and structural constraints explain, in part, why I do not
focus on an Indigenous legal order in my course on Aboriginal and
Indigenous law. 122 If I do teach about Indigenous legal orders in my course,
I focus on the theoretical and methodological frameworks that we can use
to approach these legal orders. I believe that Canadian Aboriginal law first
needs to be deconstructed, and students need to learn how to critically
interrogate their assumptions about race, Indigeneity, and the prioritization
of settler worldviews and interests. 123 Although Indigenous legal orders are
made of “stronger stuff,” 124 we should endeavour to reduce compromising
their integrity as much as possible. 125 Yes, Indigenous legal orders are
dynamic, responsive, and resilient. However, when Canadian law stains
Indigenous law in ways that sustain settler colonialism, and these threads are
woven back into Indigenous law, we might want to be more concerned
about what’s been gathered together. One way to do this is to develop
courses that are rooted in an Indigenous legal order. 126
Mills argues that “where the lifeworlds of the peoples to be brought into a pluralist
arrangement are not only different but different in kind, external legal pluralism sometimes
allows ‘legal pluralism’ to serve as a redescription of imperialism” Id. at 854.
Borrows argues that Indigenous law should ideally provide its own autonomous categories,
rather than relying on existing categories in western law. Heroes and Tricksters, supra note
8, at 808–09.
An Inside Job, supra note 8, at 733–34.
See supra text accompanying note 23.
I incorporate Indigenous legal perspectives throughout the course, and I use Mills’ work
to frame the overall structure of the course. However, I do not dedicate any lectures to a
particular Indigenous legal tradition. For the most part, I focus on Canadian law and how it
purports to relate to Indigenous legal orders.
Mills proposes that students receive instruction on how liberal constitutionalism shapes the
stories that the dominant Canadian legal system tells about law. The Lifeworlds of Law, supra
note 8, at 870. I agree and would add that other critical legal theories, such as critical race
theory or critical feminist legal theory, can contribute to our understanding of settler colonial
legal systems. I describe this further in this essay.
An Inside Job, supra note 8, at 754.
Mills “advocate[s] for caution in how we go about encouraging the study of Indigenous
legal orders.” The Lifeworlds of Law, supra note 8, at 872.
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However, teaching a stand-alone course in an Indigenous legal
tradition also poses its own challenges. Personally, I would not be
comfortable teaching a course in Nehiyaw wiyasiwêwina, Anishinaabe
inaakonigewin or Métis law. To be competent in such an undertaking, at
least in my own understanding of what competency means in this context, I
would have to dedicate a significant part of my life to this study. Ideally, I
need to learn the language through which an Indigenous legal order is
expressed. 127 But as a tenure-track assistant professor who is just starting his
PhD, I do not have the capacity to do so. Because of my junior status, there
are structural constraints on my ability to live a life that will permit me to
educate myself and others about Indigenous law. I imagine that many other
newly hired Indigenous law professors are in a similar position, likely due
to the recent momentum in law schools to hire Indigenous faculty. Although
many law schools are deeply invested in delivering Indigenous law courses,
the demands placed on Indigenous faculty members pull against making
this a reality.
It is generally known that many pre-tenure faculty members try to
harmonize their teaching, research, and service as much as possible because
they know that research is both hard to do during the teaching term and is
weighted more strongly than teaching and service during tenure review.
Indigenous faculty members whose research is not related to Indigenous
law cannot harmonize their Indigenous law-related teaching and service
obligations with their research agenda. A law school that wants a course in
Indigenous law might be asking a pre-tenure faculty member to pursue
additional community-based research that is necessary to teach an
Indigenous legal order even though that member’s primary research is in
another area. To teach an Indigenous legal order, I believe an educator
must commit to learning an Indigenous language and honouring their
relationships with the Indigenous nation sharing its legal tradition. Thus,
aside from considerations such as the content and delivery of such a course,
there are structural barriers for pre-tenure faculty tasked with this work.
In response to the risks and structural barriers noted above, I propose
to offer a course in Indigenous legal theory rather than on an Indigenous
legal order. This course would introduce students to Indigenous legal
research methodologies and methods with a focus on how Indigenous legal
orders might be approached, revitalized, and applied. 128 Since there is no
single Indigenous legal methodology, students would be introduced to
methodologies such as critical Indigenous legal theory; trans-systemic,
pluralistic, hybrid approaches; and rooted constitutionalism. 129 Students
For a discussion of the relationship between language and an Indigenous legal order, see
Craft, supra note 23, at 15; see also Drake, supra note 4, at 30–31.
Harland, supra note 8; An Inside Job, supra note 8, at 733.
Critical Indigenous Legal Theory, supra note 10; Aaron James (Waabishki Ma’iingan)
Mills, Rooted Constitutionalism: Growing Political Community, in RESURGENCE AND
127

128
129
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would also receive training in several different methods for receiving,
learning, and teaching Indigenous law, such as the narrative analysis method
developed by the University of Victoria’s Indigenous Law Research Unit, 130
land-based learning and environmental observation, 131 critical introspection
and self-reflection, 132 and community, elder, or spiritually-guided learning. 133
This course will also focus on Indigenous legal practice—what it means to
be an Indigenous person or a settler practicing Indigenous law in either
Indigenous or settler colonial legal contexts. 134 The purpose of this course
will be to equip students with the intellectual and effective resources to
critically engage with Indigenous and settler colonial law. I would like
students to see that their specific engagement with either legal order is a
choice that is informed by their epistemological, ontological, and even
cosmological commitments. In short, the focus of the course will be on the
theory and practice of Indigenous law and not any particular Indigenous
legal order.
Students—especially non-Indigenous students—also need to
understand the seriousness of their role as legal professionals, as individuals
trained in applying methodologies of legal reasoning to stories,
relationships, and cases. At least for now, few law students can escape the
cultural, social, and professional context they enter into when they become
lawyers. They will be changed. 135 And when they go into a community, they
arrive as lawyers, as technicians of law—even if they aspire to something
else. 136 They will be looked to and be seen as possessing skill and
competency in legal reasoning. At the same time, students need to develop
RECONCILIATION: INDIGENOUS-SETTLER RELATIONS AND EARTH TEACHINGS 133
(Michael Asch, John Borrows, & James Tully eds., 2018) (Can.); Willie Ermine, The Ethical
Space of Engagement, 6 INDIGENOUS L.J. 193 (2007) (Can.); Henderson, supra note 11.
With or Without You, supra note 8; Gathering the Threads, supra note 8; An Inside Job,
supra note 8; Emily Snyder, Val Napoleon & John Borrows, Gender and Violence: Drawing
on Indigenous Legal Resources, 48 U.B.C. L. REV. 593 (2015) (Can.); Heroes and
Tricksters, supra note 8; Hannah Askew, Learning from Bear-Walker: Indigenous Legal
Orders and Intercultural Legal Education in Canadian Law Schools, 33 WINDSOR Y.B.
ACCESS TO JUST. 29 (2016).
Outsider Education, supra note 8; see Drake, supra note 4, at 31–32.
Critical Indigenous Legal Theory, supra note 10. For an example of a settler’s journey
through this process, compare the writings of Rupert Ross, which disclose a shifting
perspective and approach to Indigenous legal orders. RUPERT ROSS, DANCING WITH A
GHOST: EXPLORING ABORIGINAL REALITY (2d ed. 2006) (Can.) [hereinafter DANCING
WITH A GHOST]; RUPERT ROSS, RETURNING TO THE TEACHINGS: EXPLORING ABORIGINAL
JUSTICE (1996) (Can.) [hereinafter RETURNING TO THE TEACHINGS].
Driving the Gift Home, supra note 13.
Road Back In, supra note 22; Four Questions, supra note 22; JOHNSON, supra note 20;
Askew, supra note 130; DANCING WITH A GHOST, supra note 132; RETURNING TO THE
TEACHINGS, supra note 132.
JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 39; Road Back In, supra note 22, at 232.
Shin Imai, A Counter-Pedagogy for Social Justice: Core Skills for Community-Based
Lawyering, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 195 (2002) (Can.); Road Back In, supra note 22.
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skills and competencies that will prepare them for practice in or in relation
to Indigenous community contexts. 137 When they do draw from an
Indigenous legal tradition, they must consider the potential violence caused
by the extraction and redeployment of Indigenous legal resources,
particularly within the neoliberal marketplace of legal services. 138 I think that
a course that focuses on methodology is appropriate to this context.
It is not my intention to privilege methodology over Indigenous legal
orders, or the stories and experiences that give them life and application.
Within the western empirical tradition there is a risk of methodologism, the
prioritization or idolization of the empirical scientific method over other
An Indigenous community context is not as rare as some students might think. If a lawyer
is advising a municipality, for example, they will need to take into consideration impacts of
municipal decision-making on nearby Indigenous communities. Similarly, lawyers that work
for proponents in a variety of industries will need to understand the Indigenous community
context and the Crown-Indigenous relationship because proponents regularly discharge the
procedural components of the Crown’s constitutional duty to consult and accommodate. As
Drake points out, there are other reasons why law students should learn about law in
Indigenous-practice contexts. Any law student may one day become a judge tasked with
interpreting an Indigenous legal order. Law schools need to prepare their students to be able
to “grasp the Indigenous ontology, epistemology, ethic, and logic” of an Indigenous
community and “discern the normative principles within sources of Indigenous law, such as
stories, land, and language.” Drake, supra note 4 at 21–22. There is another question of what
these skills and competencies are, and what they should be called. The Truth and
Reconciliation Commission specifically identified cultural competency as a required
competency for the legal profession. The Advocate’s Society and Aboriginal Legal Services
have each produced guides on Indigenous cultural competency. THE ADVOCATES’ SOCIETY,
INDIGENOUS BAR ASSOCIATION, & LAW SOCIETY OF ONTARIO, Guide for Lawyers
Working
with
Indigenous
Peoples
(2018),
https://www.advocates.ca/Upload/Files/PDF/Advocacy/BestPracticesPublications/Guide_fo
r_Lawyers_Working_with_Indigenous_Peoples_may16.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2LEQ99AQ]; LORNA FADDEN, COMMUNICATING EFFECTIVELY WITH INDIGENOUS CLIENTS
(Jonathan
Rudin
&
Amanda
Carling
eds.,
2017),
https://aboriginallegal.ca/downloads/communicating-with-indigenous-clients.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GQ45-56GT] (Can.). The Canadian Bar Association has developed an
online course based on an Indigenous cultural competency approach: CANADIAN BAR
ASS’N, The Path: Your Journey through Indigenous Canada (2021)
https://www.cba.org/ThePath?lang=en-ca&utm_source=cba&utm_medium=email
[https://perma.cc/8CD9-YDJ5]. Some scholars reject or caution against reducing such
competencies to “cultural competency.” Toward a Pedagogy, supra note 22, at 889; Pooja
Parmar, Reconciliation and Ethical Lawyering: Some Thoughts on Cultural Competence, 97
CAN. B. REV. 526, 536–41 (2019) (Can.).
Mills and Drake caution against the risk of epistemic violence that might arise from an
uncritical engagement with Indigenous legal orders: The Lifeworlds of Law, supra note 8, at
868; Drake, supra note 4, at 20–21. Indigenous legal principles, such as humility, may
motivate students to critically reflect on why and how they are engaging with an Indigenous
legal order. See, for example, Lindsay Borrows’ discussion of dabaadendiziwin. Borrows,
supra note 26. Askew describes an approach centered in debewewin, which she interprets as
“a quality of intellectual humility.” Askew, supra note 130, at 38. Askew’s article, Learning
from Bear-Walker, is an introspective description of her engagement with Anishinaabe law
with the Chippewas of Nawash Unceded First Nation at Neyaashiinigmiing.
137

138

766

2022]

SOME REFLECTIONS OF A MÉTIS LAW STUDENT

767

social, cultural, and theoretical ways of understanding. 139 This is not my
intention when I discuss the importance of methodology. The purpose of
methodology is to be better able to understand one or more aspects of the
multiple truths of our individual and collective experiences. 140 Each
methodology provides a different perspective on these truths. How we carry
out Indigenous legal education is a question of methodology. We need to
be conscious of our choices.
I also believe that we should integrate Indigenous legal issues,
perspectives, and orders throughout the curriculum. I distinguish between
these three things purposefully. Non-Indigenous faculty members will be
called on to implement the TRC’s Calls in their courses, with little direction
on how to do so. Very few of them will have training in either Indigenous
legal theory or methodologies, and even fewer, if any, will have training in
an Indigenous legal order. For this reason, we can think about integration
as a continuum, starting with a critical integration of Indigenous legal issues
in a course. We might use critical legal theory, legal realism, feminist, critical
race, or critical disability theory to take a deeper look at the application of
Canadian law to Indigenous persons. Indigenous perspectives can be
brought in to show the importance of worldview and narrative in how we
understand these legal issues. Talking about Indigenous “perspectives” does
not diminish the importance of Indigenous legal perspectives rooted in
Indigenous legal orders. It is simply a starting point.
Additionally, I am proposing a multi-stage project to integrate
Indigenous legal issues, perspectives, and orders in our curriculum.
Integration reduces the amount of material that must be covered in an
Aboriginal law course, allowing for material on Indigenous legal theory to
be addressed instead. For example, students can be introduced to the
relationship between fee simple property and Aboriginal title, matrimonial
property, or the law related to Indigenous human remains and intellectual
property, in property law; to anti-Indigenous bias in pre-, mid-, and posttrial procedures, and Indigenous alternative dispute resolution processes in
criminal law; or to Indigenous legal theories in a legal theory course.
Integration may also support either a critical approach to the common law
or trans-systemic approaches to Indigenous and Canadian legal orders.
When I arrived at Lincoln Alexander, I prepared a handbook with a
summary of my thoughts on the integration of Indigenous legal education
in each of the first-year courses. I included cases and summaries of readings
to orient non-Indigenous faculty with each area. I tried to go beyond the
more obvious examples of Gladue in a criminal law course or Tsilhqot’in

Zhipeng Gao, Methodologism/Methodological Imperative, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CRITICAL PSYCH. 1176–79 (Thomas Teo ed., 2014), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-46145583-7_614 [https://perma.cc/P8BL-W8XN].
Indigenous epistemologies include empirical methods of observation. See, e.g., Outsider
Education, supra note 8, at 2–5.
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in property law and include other cases and examples. 141 I offered one-onone assistance with curriculum development for interested faculty members.
Before a session with a colleague, I might ask them to send me their syllabus
so that I can see their pedagogical objectives and the relative placement of
the Indigenous material in their course. I could then provide a few readings,
cases, or comments to start our discussion.
During the session, I might try to understand the unique interests of
the faculty member. For example, a faculty member might be interested in
corporeal property—human remains—in their property law course. I might
respond
by
providing
material
on cases
involving the
repatriation/rematriation of ancestors, legislation governing Indigenous
burials, references to literature in museum studies, or Indigenous legal
traditions related to feasting. The faculty member would then consider the
material and decide whether or how to incorporate it in their course. I might
ask the faculty member to follow up with me so that I can document how
others might incorporate this material in the same course. This information
can be collected in a publicly accessible database. Such a database might
reduce the labour contributed by Indigenous professors at other law
schools. It might also generate discussions in new doctrinal areas or expand
existing discussions to consider new issues or perspectives. This project has
received a lot of interest and support within the faculty.
Apart from curricular questions, I think a lot about how we can best
support our Indigenous students at Lincoln Alexander. In addition to
academic support, Indigenous students should have access to “life
support”—communities of care that are adequately funded and supported
by the institution. 142 This life support may include an elders-in-residence
program, institutionally supported Indigenous student associations, and
facilities for ceremonies and gathering. Indigenous students should also
have an opportunity to learn about the basics of legal research and writing
and to learn one of the most challenging courses—like property or criminal
law—or an Indigenous legal order in an optional, credited, fully funded,
summer program for Indigenous students before they are thrown into their
first year of law school. 143
Each law school needs to institutionalize these activities in intentional
ways that support (or lessen the workload of) Indigenous faculty. For
R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 (Can.); Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2014]
2 S.C.R. 257 (Can.).
JOHNSON, supra note 20, at 25.
This was the intent and structure of the Program of Legal Studies for Native People at the
University of Saskatchewan. The PLSNP was cancelled in 2020. In response, the Allard
School of Law at the University of British Columbia offered a summer course on tort law for
Indigenous law students. ALLARD SCH. OF L. & UNIV. OF B.C., ILS Summer Intensive in
141

142
143

Tort Law Builds Community, Provides Skill Development and Indigenous Legal
Perspectives (2021), https://allard.ubc.ca/about-us/news-and-announcements/2021/ilssummer-intensive-tort-law-builds-community-provides-skill-development-and-indigenouslegal [https://perma.cc/7VRQ-GGAZ].
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example, law schools may hire dedicated staff such as directors or managers
of Indigenous legal education and reconciliation, empower a faculty
committee dedicated to Indigenization and decolonization, envision plans
for decolonization, 144 and create an institutional culture that sees these
activities as the shared responsibility of Indigenous and non-Indigenous
faculty and staff. Each law school may differ in how it undertakes this work,
even though all are committed to implementing the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission’s Call to Action 28. 145
IV.

CONCLUSION

It may be naïve to say this, but I am optimistic that things are changing
within legal education. Incoming students at Lincoln Alexander have
benefited from recent changes made to secondary and post-secondary
curricula, some in light of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s work
or the advocacy of Indigenous educators. Growing up in northern
Saskatchewan, I was an early beneficiary of a curriculum that required all
elementary school students to attend Nehiyaw language and culture classes,
including land-based education. My school experience complemented the
rest of my life in the community. A lot has happened in the six years since
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s final report. I feel that students
are more aware than they were when I was in law school (even though I was
of the Idle No More generation). 146
Indigenous legal scholars have also shifted the field of Canadian
Aboriginal law from its almost non-existent foundations forty-years ago.
They have contributed to the theorization of Indigenous legal orders, legal
pluralism, and to Indigenous legal pedagogies and methodologies. I feel that
the challenge we have, as Indigenous law professors, is presenting this
diversity while also drawing it together in all aspects of the educational
institution, not just the curriculum. And I do not mean to imply that it is
solely up to us to do this. I think non-Indigenous law professors can and
should play an important role in deconstructing settler supremacy
embedded in the rule of law.
As I do this work, I want to continue thinking about two things. First,
how can I best support both the Indigenous and non-Indigenous students
in my courses? What works for one cohort might not work for the other. I
anticipate difficult ethical choices. But I know that one of my primary
concerns is the effect of racial prejudice in the classroom and its permeation
144
145

Hewitt, supra note 19, at 78, 82.
Adrien Habermacher, Understanding the Ongoing Dialogues on Indigenous Issues in

Canadian Legal Education through the Lens of Institutional Cultures (Case Studies at
UQAM, UAlberta, and UMoncton), 57 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 37, 96 (2020).
See generally, THE KINO-NDA-NIIMI COLLECTIVE, THE WINTER WE DANCED: VOICES
146

FROM THE PAST, THE FUTURE, AND THE IDLE NO MORE MOVEMENT (2014) (describing the
Idle No More generation).
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into the content that is taught. Second, how can I bring decolonization into
my work in integrating Indigenous legal issues, perspectives, and laws into
Canadian legal education and practice? I feel a pause when I ask myself this
question. I wonder whether Indigenization is even appropriate within the
current institutional structure. What are the risks of proceeding with our
current momentum? If anything, I think that my practice of decolonization
must be relational. I suppose there is a third thing I’m thinking about. What
does it mean to be “here to stay, but not in the same way”?
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